Single sign-on sanity check
Single sign-on isn't the same as single oversight.
Connecting an app to Microsoft 365 sign-in solves the login. It doesn't automatically mean anyone reviews what that app can now reach, or notices the app nobody connected at all. A sanity check does that, the same plain way the Conditional Access review does.
Book a scoping callFour patterns worth naming out loud
Where single sign-on quietly stops covering everything.
- Unlinked
An app that never got connected
It still runs on its own separate username and password, sitting outside every access review the rest of the tenant gets.
- Orphaned
An app connected, then forgotten
Single sign-on was set up during a rollout, and nobody has looked at who can still reach it since.
- Overprivileged
Sign-in access implies more than intended
Connecting an app through Microsoft 365 identity can quietly grant it broader access than the single sign-on button suggests.
- Outlived
Access outlives the person
An app tied to a personal, not company-managed, login can keep working for someone long after their Microsoft 365 account is disabled.
What this is—and is not
Sanity check, not a CASB.
A plain review of what's actually connected, not a cloud-access security platform.
This is the same kind of review Conditional Access already gets, pointed at every other app your team signs into: does single sign-on actually cover the apps people use daily, does anyone know the full list, and would removing someone's Microsoft 365 account actually cut off everything it should? It doesn't produce a security posture score, monitor traffic to every SaaS app in real time, or replace a dedicated cloud-access security broker.
The goal is the same honest, narrower promise as the Conditional Access check: catch the app nobody remembers connecting, or the one that was never connected at all, before it becomes the access nobody thought to remove.
What belongs in the monthly view
Five recurring checks.
- New apps adopted since the last review are connected to Microsoft 365 sign-in where that's the sensible option
- Apps still running on standalone logins are named on a list, not just assumed to be minor
- A departed employee's access is checked against connected apps, not only the primary account
- Any app granted broader access than its sign-on button implies has a documented reason
- Shared or generic logins used to bypass sign-on entirely are identified and reduced where practical
When the question is deeper than a sanity check
A full SaaS access inventory or an identity platform is a separate decision.
Dozens of connected apps, a change of identity provider, or a dedicated access-governance platform is a bigger question than a recurring review can absorb. It deserves its own scoping conversation, the same way a formal Conditional Access hardening project would.
Connect this to the rest of care